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Abstract—Novel attacks continue to appear against in-vehicle
networks due to the increasing complexity of heterogeneous
software and hardware components used in vehicles. These new
components introduce challenges when developing efficient and
adaptable security mechanisms. Several intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDS) have been proposed to identify and protect in-vehicle
networks against malicious activities. We describe the state-
of-the-art intrusion detection methods for securing automotive
networks, with special focus on the Controller Area Network
(CAN). We provide a description of vulnerabilities, highlight
threat models, identify known attack vectors present in CAN, and
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of suggested solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued integration of Internet-of-Things technolo-
gies and demonstrated cyber attacks on automotive in-vehicle
networks [1]–[3] motivate a need for automotive cyber secu-
rity. Network-based attacks are relatively recent in automo-
biles; due to the introduction of interconnectivity in modern
vehicles. As depicted in Fig. 1, modern vehicles contain
multiple interfaces that expose the vehicle to cyber-attacks.
With the future emergence of fully autonomous vehicles, the
need for securing automobiles will greatly increase. These
vehicles must behave securely, predictably, and reliably. Auto-
motive cyber attacks can result in catastrophic consequences,
including the loss of human life.
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Fig. 1. Automotive attack surfaces.
One option to enhance the security of in-vehicle networks
is to adopt intrusion detection and prevention techniques.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are used to mitigate intru-
sions in computer network systems. However, many traditional
techniques in network security cannot be directly applied to
vehicular networks. Thus, an effective and efficient IDS that
can work for in-vehicle networks is an important need.
In this paper, we explore the methods and approaches
researchers have taken to identify threats against vehicles
and how to address them with IDS approaches. Our main
contribution, is to unify the assumptions, threat models, and
terminology used in the research area of automotive IDS.
II. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
A. Vulnerabilities of CAN
CAN is an asynchronous, serial, multi-master communica-
tion network protocol that connects Electronic Control Units
(ECUs) [4]. Vehicles, airplanes, and industrial machinery
utilize CAN to reduce network complexity and wiring costs.
The CAN architecture was envisioned to be lightweight and
robust and designed to be unsegmented, unencrypted, and
lacking authentication so that CAN messages could flow freely
to and from each ECU. However, these properties directly lead
to CAN’s security vulnerabilities:
1) Lack of Message Authentication: Each ECU broadcasts
and receives all data on the CAN bus then decides whether
messages are meant for them. CAN by design is unable to
prevent unauthorized devices from joining the bus and broad-
casting malicious messages to all the ECUs. By accessing the
bus, hackers can send spoofed messages to any ECU on the
network. Security in this context is provided only through a
lack of open documentation. A hacker needs to dedicate time
and resources to reverse engineer the CAN protocol before
being able to launch malicious attacks on a particular vehicle.
2) Unsegmented Network: All ECUs are connected to a
common network. This is a major reason CAN was adopted
in automotive networks, to reduce the needed wiring for
point-to-point connections between the various subsystems.
However, this reduction means a system component dealing
with infotainment can communicate to safety-critical vehicle
subsystems. While some manufacturers utilize some network
segmentation for safety-critical systems, by design there is still
cross-communication between safety-critical and non-critical
systems.
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3) Unencrypted Messages: CAN was designed to be
lightweight and robust in the 1980s, when car hacking was not
a reality. At the time, the addition of encryption would only
slow down CAN messages and clog the network. However,
because CAN traffic is unencrypted, it can be easily sniffed,
spoofed, modified, and replayed. There is a large area of
research in applying encryption to automotive networks [5]–
[7].
B. Threats and Attacks
Recent interest in CAN bus security has grown due to
several demonstrations of security breaches in automotive
systems. Koscher et al. [8] were the first to implement and
demonstrate that an attacker who can infiltrate virtually any
ECU can circumvent a broad array of safety-critical systems
by directly interfacing with the OBD-II port. By sniffing the
CAN bus network and reverse engineering ECU code, they
demonstrated complete control of a wide range of functions:
disabling the brakes, stopping the engine, and controlling other
vehicle functions.
Checkoway et al. [1] later demonstrated that a vehicle
can be exploited remotely. Previous research had shown that
internal networks within vehicles are insecure, however the
requirement of physical access was viewed as unrealistic. They
gained access without having physical access, and attacked
the vehicle over a broad range of attack vectors, including
Bluetooth and infotainment systems. The authors concluded
that security practices in vehicles should use similar methods
as traditional networks to restrict access and improve code
security.
Valasek and Miller [9] demonstrated real-world attacks on
multiple vehicles via the CAN bus. The authors remotely
engaged the brakes of a Jeep Cherokee while it was on a live
highway and ran the vehicle into a ditch. They accomplished
their attacks without having prior access to the vehicle. In
response, Chrysler recalled 1.4 million vehicles.
III. BACKGROUND ON INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are software or hardware
systems that automate the attack detection process, usually
through the use of sensors and reporting systems. Most modern
IDS monitor either the host computers or networks to capture
intrusion related data [10]–[14]. We examine approaches and
implementations of traditional IDS and how these principles
can be applied to automotive security.
A. Host-based
A Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) resides
in and monitors the host system. In automobiles, a host-
based IDS would reside in individual ECUs, where it monitors
the traffic packets entering and leaving, and check to ensure
packets are not malicious. A HIDS would also monitor the
ECU itself to detect behavior indicative of an intrusion. A
practical challenge with any automotive HIDS is that unlike
traditional hosts, many ECUs lack sufficient processing power.
Implementing an automotive HIDS would consequently re-
quire significant ECU redesign by manufacturers.
B. Network-based
A Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is
part of the communication system and monitors all traffic
traversing the network. Information monitored include header
and content of each message or packet. An automotive NIDS
monitors all traffic on the network with the NIDS acting as an
ECU, so that it can receive and monitor all messages broadcast.
C. Intrusion Detection Methods
Intrusion detection methods can be classified under two
main categories: signature and anomaly-based.
1) Signature-Based: Signature-based approaches detect at-
tacks using a pre-defined knowledge base of attack signatures
that is captured and created, and current network traffic is
monitored for these signatures. This detection mechanism is
effective in detecting known attacks with high accuracy and
low error rates. However, signature-based IDSs cannot detect
any attack not defined in the database, and therefore are unable
to detect new attacks, nor any deviation from known attacks.
It is critical to maintain the knowledge base and update it
frequently for accurate detection.
2) Anomaly-Based: Anomaly-based intrusion detection
typically starts with a training or normal model of the system’s
activity. To obtain best accuracy in detection, the normal model
must be thorough. The IDS then compares current system’s
activity to past captured normal model to detect variations
in behavior and label those deviations as anomalies. Any
deviation not captured in the normal profile could be correctly
or mistakenly identified as an intrusion. It is important to have
the most complete normal profile, so the system does not
suffer from high rates of false positives. The main advantage of
anomaly detection is its ability to identify new and previously
unknown attacks.
IV. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS FOR AUTOMOTIVE
SECURITY
We investigate how researchers are applying traditional in-
trusion detection approaches to securing automotive networks.
We summarize some of the cutting edge work on automotive
intrusion detection in Table I and discuss their advantages and
drawbacks.
A. Message Timing
In normal vehicle operation, each message ID generated
by an ECU has a regular frequency. When attackers inject
messages to execute a command to an ECU, this frequency
will unexpectedly change. Even when an attacker is injecting
messages, the ECUs still send their messages periodically.
Eventually, rate of messages on the network will be increased
by a factor of more than 2 to 100 times, depending on the
attacker’s injection speed. Miller and Valasek reported that
they needed to inject at a rate of at least 20 times faster
than normal for their attack to be successful [9]. Because the
original ECU is still transmitting its message, an attacker needs
to send in messages at a fast enough rate to overwrite the
normal message with the same ID.
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Detection is based on the following principles.
1) When a new message is transmitted on the CAN bus,
the IDS will check the ID and compute the time interval
from the arrival time of the latest message.
2) If the time interval of the new message is shorter than
the normal model, the IDS indicates message as an
anomalous message due to this message is arriving
sooner than expected.
A conceptual diagram on the effects of message injection
attacks on normal traffic is given in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Transmitted messages on CAN bus (a) under normal status and (b)
under message injection attack. The time interval of message CAN ID 0x02
is shortened by the injection of attack messages. Based on Song et at. [15]
Miller and Valasek [16] introduced a concept of analyzing
the rate of messages for in-vehicle network intrusion detection.
The number of messages on the CAN bus is the sum of
the number of normal messages and attack messages. By
analyzing the distribution rate of messages, it should be
possible to detect anomalous messages.
Researchers have explored utilizing message timing features
for intrusion detection. These works have shown good results
in using message intervals for detecting a significant threat
to automotive security, message injection. Gmiden et al. [17]
proposed a simple intrusion detection method for CAN bus.
Their proposed algorithm does not require any modification
to the CAN bus, which would mitigate changes to the native
system and computational overhead, and is based on the
analysis of time intervals of CAN messages. Their future work
involves implementing and evaluating their proposed detection
method.
Moore et al. [19] proposed an anomaly detector based
on the regularity of CAN message frequency. Similar to the
detection method proposed by Gmiden [17], Moore’s detector
relies on the time intervals of CAN messages. They observed
regularity in the signal frequencies, and hypothesize that a
simple anomaly detection system monitoring the inter-signal
wait times of CAN bus traffic will provide accurate detection
of a regular-frequency signal injection attacks. To test their
detector, they defined and executed three signal injection
attacks. They conclude that their approach is a promising
avenue for accurate detection of an important class of CAN
bus attacks.
Song et al. [15] also proposed a lightweight intrusion
detection algorithm that examines the time interval of CAN
messages. They evaluated how three different types of message
injection attacks affect the unique time interval of each CAN
ID. They combined 100 one-second samples of normal and
attack data logs and then applied their IDS to determine which
logs were of attacks. They determined that the time interval is a
feature capable in detecting message injection attacks in CAN
bus traffic by showing there was a clear difference between
time intervals of messages in normal status and attack status.
The strength of their proposed detection algorithm is that it is
simple and efficient to use.
Utilizing the CAN message timing intervals show good
detection capabilities with minimal change to the vehicle’s
native network. This approach using CAN message timing
features has shown the most success in detecting known
attacks. However, the simplicity of these methods currently
limit them to detecting attacks that inject numerous messages
onto the CAN bus. While the majority of demonstrated attacks
have been message injection, it is conceivable that other
methods of attacks exist. We examine alternative detection
methods in the following sections.
B. Signature-Based
Larson et al. [20] proposed a specification-based attack
detection approach that has a detector placed in each ECU.
The incoming and outgoing network traffic can be analyzed
based on information from the protocol stack and object
directory of the CAN-protocol at the expected ECU. They
show that potential attacks can be detected from the trace
of extracted information through theoretical simulation. The
authors inferred that a likely target for attackers is the gateway
ECU because a variety of attacks can be accomplished when
it is compromised. Further development in this area is likely
needed.
C. Anomaly-Based
As previously mentioned, a limiting factor of implementing
complex intrusion detection systems is the computing power of
ECUs. ECUs come in varying complexity and sophistication
from a simple seat control unit that adjusts seat height and
angle to complex engine control units that control a variety
of engine functions. Some of the following techniques are
computationally heavy and implementing them onto automo-
tive networks may require major redesign of the underlying
components.
1) Cyber-Physical: Several researchers have proposed us-
ing innate characteristics of individual ECUs to build an
alternative to timing-based IDS. Cho and Shin [21] introduced
a clock-based IDS that uses clock skew (timing error) to
authenticate ECUs. The IDS records communications on the
CAN bus and creates fingerprints of every ECU on the
network. Each ECU is assigned a fingerprint based on their
specific clock skew and this is used to distinguish them. The
authors proposed that by analyzing the CPU clocks behaviors,
spoofing attacks can be detected in the network. A similar
approach is considered by Ji et al. [22]. They investigate a
detection method based on clock drift.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED IDSS FOR IN-VEHICLE NETWORKS
Detection Feature Proposed System Intrusions Detected Evaluation
Message Frequency Miller and Valasek (2016) [16] Message Injection Live Road TestsHoppe (2008) [18] Message Injection and Deletion Testbench Simulation
Message Interval
Gmiden (2016) [17] N/A No Evaluation
Song (2016) [15] Message Injection Live Road Tests
Moore (2017) [19] Message Injection Real Vehicle Simulation
Signatures Larson (2008) [20] Known Attacks with Defined Signatures Theoretical Simulation
Cyber-Physical
Cho and Shin (2016) [21] Spoofing Real Vehicle Simulation
Ji (2018) [22] Injection and Suspension Attack Testbench Simulation
Choi (2018) [23] Bus-Off Attack Real Vehicle Simulation
Entropy Marchetti (2016) [24] Message Injection Real Vehicle SimulationMu¨ter (2011) [25] Various Attacks Real Vehicle Simulation
CAN Fields Matsumoto (2012) [26] Message Spoofing No Evaluation
Markovitz (2017) [27] N/A Real and Simulated CANTraffic
Sensor Data Mu¨ter (2010) [28] Message Injection No Evaluation
Deep Neural Network Kang and Kang (2016) [29] Attacks based off Statistical Features SW Simulation with OCTANE
Choi et al. [23] proposed VoltageIDS, a system that lever-
ages the electrical CAN signal characteristics as a fingerprint
of the ECUs. This approach does not require any modification
of the vehicular system and can distinguish between errors
and bus-off attacks. They evaluated their IDS on moving as
well as idling vehicles. The method is shown to be capable of
detecting the recently introduced bus-off attack.
2) Entropy: Entropy-based intrusion detection has been
applied to traditional network-based systems, but typically has
a high rate of false positives [25] due to typical traffic variance.
As automotive network traffic tends to be more periodic,
entropy-based detection has been shown to detect anomalies
with a low rate of false-positives. Mu¨ter et al. [25], using data
recorded from the in-vehicle network communication during
normal operation, calculated the Shannon entropy value. Devi-
ations from that entropy are identified as potential intrusions.
Marchetti et al. [24] proposed an entropy-based algorithm
for detecting anomalies in CAN messages in an unmodified
vehicle. They conducted extensive evaluations based on several
hours of CAN traffic captured during driving sessions on
public motorways. Their experimental evaluations show that
entropy-based anomaly detectors are a viable approach for
identifying CAN bus anomalies caused by attackers injecting
messages.
3) Message Rate: Hoppe et al. [18] proposed an anomaly-
based IDS that is placed on the CAN bus so that it can listen to
network traffic. Their IDS examines the rate of transmission of
specific messages and compares it to what is normal to detect
additional or missing messages. This approach differs from
other timing-based approaches as it counts rate of transmission
of packets as opposed to the timing intervals of the packets.
Deviations from the expected normal number of messages
transmitted are identified as anomalies. Their future work
involves implementing and evaluating their proposed detection
method.
4) CAN-Fields: Several works utilize the makeup and data
fields of CAN messages for anomaly detection. Matsumoto et
al. [26] proposed a method of preventing unauthorized data
transmission in CAN. Each ECU monitors all the data on the
bus, and broadcasts an error message if it recognizes spoofed
messages with its own ID, before the unauthorized message is
completely transmitted. Markovitz et al. [27] proposed a novel
domain-aware anomaly detection system for CAN bus traffic.
They discovered semantically meaningful fields through the
inspection of real CAN traffic. They developed a greedy
algorithm to split CAN messages into fields and classify
these fields into specific types they observed. Their anomaly
detection system uses classifiers to characterize the fields and
build a model for the messages, based on their field types in the
learning phase. In the enforcement phase, the system detects
deviations from the model. They evaluated their system on
simulated and real CAN traffic and achieved near zero false
positives. These methods require a deeper understanding of
CAN messages and reverse engineering of the messages and
their data fields.
5) Other Works: Mu¨ter et al. [28] introduced an approach
for anomaly detection using sensors to recognize attacks on in-
vehicle networks during normal vehicle operation. The authors
discussed the design and the application criteria for attack
detection in the network, especially the CAN bus, without
causing false positives. This detection scheme consists of eight
sensors for detecting an attack. The sensors serve as a criteria
for recognizing a threat to the automobile by monitoring
different aspects of the network. In their proposed approach,
the applicability of these sensors is based on different criteria
such as the type and number of messages, the number of
buses they need to access, and if the payload of the message
needs inspection. The authors showed sensor data results can
be evaluated and how to integrate the approach into an holistic
IDS concept.
Kang and Kang [29] proposed a machine learning based IDS
approach using a deep neural network structure to monitor
CAN packets to extract feature bits. The IDS consists of
two modules. A monitoring module that decides a type of
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CAN packet based on trained features of known attacks. Once
the monitoring module identifies a new attack, a profiling
module records the attack model and updates the system for an
upcoming packet. They reported a 99 percent detection ratio
while keeping false positives under 1 to 2 percent through
software simulation. However, the authors did not discuss the
overhead to implement their machine learning approach on
modern vehicles.
There are multiple CAN and vehicle ECU characteristics
that can be leveraged for intrusion detection in vehicles.
Some works [21]–[23] capture specific characteristics without
requiring changes to the native vehiclular system to detect
attacks. There are methods [26], [27] that require reverse
engineering of the CAN system and its messages to implement
an intrusion detection system. While it is difficult to determine
whether which approach is better, as some have not been
evaluated, the best approach to detect the most comprehensive
range of attacks may be a combination of some of these works.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined methods for applying IDSs to
securing automotive systems with an overview of the tech-
niques and a discussion of their advantages and disadvantages.
We attempted to clarify and unify the concept of anomalies
and intrusion detection regarding automotive security. This
begins with identifying threat models for automotive security
and identifying threats that effect all vehicles and not just
one specific model. From a technical perspective, IDSs can
work well for detecting intrusions on the CAN bus. Different
implementations of anomaly detection methods can detect
different types of anomalies. Current approaches have a focus
on message injection attack detection because it is the main
attack vector for hackers trying to manipulate a vehicle to
misbehave. The link to the next step after detection is to enable
prevention; an effective IDS for cyber-physical systems should
have an active response to cyberattacks. We have identified
ways for detecting attacks, but more research is needed on
mitigating those attacks after detection.
The complexity of in-vehicle networks continues to increase
with the introduction of other communication protocols in-
cluding FlexRay, LIN, and Ethernet [30]. These new protocols
introduce new vulnerabilities to vehicles. Future work should
involve investigating whether the reviewed IDS approaches for
CAN could be applied to these new protocols. Speculatively,
some of the reviewed IDS approaches could be applied to these
new networks. As research in this field continues to progress,
so will the attackers and their attacks. This progression re-
quires continual updates to threat models to identify new
vulnerabilities and attacks, and subsequent adjustments to IDS
to counter them. The fundamental issue remains that CAN,
while inherently insecure is a modern day vehicle standard,
exemplifying the need for security to be addressed throughout
the design process.
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